The War on Terrorism and the Extraterritorial Application of the Constitution in Immigration Law by Slocum, Brian G.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 84 
Issue 4 Symposium - Immigration: Both Sides 
of the Fence 
Article 4 
December 2020 
The War on Terrorism and the Extraterritorial Application of the 
Constitution in Immigration Law 
Brian G. Slocum 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Brian G. Slocum, The War on Terrorism and the Extraterritorial Application of the Constitution in 
Immigration Law, 84 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1017 (2007). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please 
contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
THE WAR ON TERRORISM AND THE EXTRATERRITORIAL








For quite some time, the prevailing judicial view has been that it is
constitutional for the government to indefinitely (even permanently) de-
tain within the United States aliens who have been stopped at our bor-
ders. The justification for these decisions is that even though these
aliens are located within the United States they are deemed, under a
doctrine known as the "entry fiction," to be outside the territory of the
United States, and thus beyond the reach of the Constitution. Recently,
however, courts have struggled with issues involving the definition and
scope of the entry fiction. Courts have faced similar issues involving the
extraterritorial application of the Constitution in cases involving the
current Guantanamo "enemy combatant" detainees. In this Article, Pro-
fessor Slocum argues that a recognition by the Supreme Court that the
current Guantanamo detainees possess at least some constitutional
rights should compel courts to conclude that aliens stopped at our bor-
ders and detained within the United States also possess constitutional
rights, including the right to be free from indefinite detention. Even if
the Court declines to recognize that the Guantanamo detainees possess
constitutional rights, lower courts should continue to reevaluate the defi-
nition and scope of the outdated and unnecessarily harsh entry fiction.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider the following two cases:
(1) The President authorizes the arrest and detention of an elderly
woman in Switzerland who for years has written large checks to a charity
that ostensibly helps orphans in Afghanistan. In reality, the charity is a
front to finance al-Qaeda activities. The woman, a Swiss national, is
arrested in Switzerland and detained by the United States on Guan-
tanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba ("Guantanamo"). The U.S. government
labels the woman an "enemy combatant" and declares that it intends to
detain her indefinitely, until the end of the government's "War on Terror-
ism."
2
(2) The President authorizes the seizure and detention of a Cuban
national who flees Cuba by boat in order to immigrate to the United
States. The Cuban national is arrested off the shores of the United States
but is detained in an American prison in Louisiana. The Cuban govern-
ment refuses to accept the return of the Cuban national and indicates that
it will never do so. The U.S. government declares that it will detain the
2. This hypothetical is modified from a hypothetical posed by a district court judge to gov-
ernment counsel during oral argument in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443,
475 (D.D.C. 2005). Government counsel asserted that the government would have authority to
detain the elderly woman. See id. The government has also indicated that it intends to hold some of
the enemy combatant detainees indefinitely. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 540 (2004)
(Souter, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he Government asserts a right to hold Hamdi under these
conditions indefinitely, that is, until the government determines that the United States is no longer
threatened by the terrorism exemplified in the attacks of September 11, 2001"). For a description of
how the government has used Guantanamo for anti-terrorism purposes see Diane Marie Amann,
Guantanamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 267-74 (2004).
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Cuban national indefinitely, although it may release him on "parole" if
one of its periodic reviews of his dangerousness warrants such release.3
The cases described above raise many important questions regard-
ing the constitutional rights of aliens indefinitely detained by the United
States.4 For example, do either of the aliens in cases (1) and (2) possess
any constitutional rights? If both are entitled to constitutional protec-
tions, do they have the same constitutional protections? If the Supreme
Court first determined in case (1), a terrorism-related case, that the de-
tainee possesses at least some constitutional rights, would the decision
compel a subsequent finding that the detainee in case (2), a traditional
immigration case,5 also possesses constitutional rights, including a lib-
erty interest sufficient to preclude indefinite detention? If a court deter-
mined that the Cuban national in case (2) could not constitutionally be
detained indefinitely, would the government still be able to effectively
use immigration provisions to protect national security?
It may seem quite counterintuitive that in 2007 the United States
could permanently detain human beings without formal charges or any
type of judicial oversight, but at this time it is not clear that either the
Swiss national in case (1) or the Cuban national in case (2) possess any
constitutional rights. Currently, courts are wrestling with the issue of
whether the government's terrorism-related alien detainees on Guan-
tanamo possess constitutional rights.6 For quite some time, immigration
law has struggled with similar issues involving the extraterritorial reach
of the Constitution. In fact, the denial of constitutional rights to aliens
stopped at the U.S. border is one of the major reasons why immigration
law has long been notorious for its failure to comply with the rule of law
and its isolation from other areas of public law.7
This Article discusses how the judicial resolution of the constitu-
tional rights of the Guantanamo alien detainees, which case (1) repre-
sents, may present a unique opportunity for reconsideration of the long-
3. This hypothetical is intended to describe facts similar to those of a typical "Mariel Cu-
ban." In 1980, approximately 125,000 Cuban nationals fled Cuba and were intercepted off the
shores of the United States. Many of the Mariel Cubans were "paroled" into the United States, but,
until recently, all of the Mariel Cubans were subject to the possibility of indefinite detention in U.S.
jails. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (explaining why the Mariel Cubans are no longer
subject to indefinite detention); see also Eliot Walker, Note, Safe Harbor: Is Clark v. Martinez the
End of the Voyage of the Mariel?, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 121 (2006). The Mariel Cubans were
subject to indefinite detention because Cuba has refused to accept their return. In addition, no other
country has expressed a willingness to accept the Mariel Cubans. See Morales-Fernandez v. I.N.S.,
418 F.3d 1116, 1118 (10th Cir. 2005).
4. The term "alien" is considered by many to be pejorative. Case law and the Immigration
and Nationality Act refer extensively to "alien" and "alienage," however. See infra note 18 (defin-
ing the term). In order to avoid unnecessary confusion, the term will be used in this Article.
5. See infra note 17 and accompanying text (defining immigration law as the law governing
the admission and expulsion of aliens).
6. See infra Part II.B. (discussing the cases).
7. See generally Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1984) (explaining immigration law's isolation from other areas of public law).
2007] 1019
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
standing problem in immigration law of the constitutional rights of aliens
stopped at the border and sometimes detained indefinitely, which case
(2) represents. Many commentators have recently focused on the gov-
ernment's use of immigration laws to combat terrorism and how these
actions have undermined sound immigration policy. 8 Scholars have also
recently focused a great deal on the egregious violations of human rights
committed in the War on Terrorism.9 Little attention, however, has been
paid to the possibility that future terrorism-related decisions, by declaring
that the Guantanamo detainees possess constitutional rights, could im-
pact immigration law in a positive manner.
Part I of this Article describes the inherent connection between the
current Guantanamo detention cases and immigration law. Part II de-
scribes the traditional understanding of the territorial limits to the appli-
cation of the Constitution in immigration law and how this traditional
understanding is now being questioned by some courts. In addition, this
Part describes how courts in the current Guantanamo detention cases
have addressed similar issues involving the extraterritorial application of
the Constitution.
A detailed analysis of whether the current Guantanamo detainees
should be recognized as possessing constitutional rights (as well as the
identity and breadth of those rights) has been made by other scholars and
is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, Part III argues that judicial
recognition that the Guantanamo detainees possess at least some consti-
tutional rights should lead to the recognition that detainees in the same
position as the Cuban national in case (2) also possess at least some con-
stitutional rights, including the right to be free from indefinite detention.
Contrary to the government's likely arguments, such a holding would be
relatively modest and would allow the government to continue to use
immigration laws, including laws authorizing detention, for national se-
curity purposes.
I. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE WAR ON TERRORISM AND
IMMIGRATION LAW
Most of the government's immigration activities are not related to
terrorism and, undoubtedly, much of its anti-terrorism activities are not
related to immigration law.' Nevertheless, there is an undeniable con-
8. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security After
September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=962963; Karen C. Tumlin, Comment, Suspect First, How
Terrorism Policy is Reshaping Immigration Policy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1173 (2004).
9. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 OxFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 235, 235 (2006) (arguing that the War Against Terrorism has violated the tradition of
requiring the "government to abide by the Constitution's restrictions on its power no matter where or
against whom it acts").
10. Before September 11, 2001, it was especially true that the government's immigration
activities were mostly not connected to its anti-terrorism efforts. See Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism,
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nection between the two. Immigration law has long been a tool used to
pursue various interests of the political branches, including ones related
to national security and foreign policy." Although the relevant provi-
sions have been amended at various times to extend or retract the gov-
ernment's powers, the Immigration and Nationality Act has consistently
contained provisions that have given the executive branch authority to
consider foreign policy consequences when making decisions regarding
deportation.' 2 Indeed, the Supreme Court has on more than one occasion
acknowledged that immigration laws serve multiple purposes, especially
ones connected to foreign policy.
13
The War on Terrorism is no exception to the historical use of immi-
gration laws to serve foreign policy and national security purposes. Im-
migration functions have been transferred to the Department of Home-
land Security, formally making immigration a national security concern
in a more direct way than in the past. Immigration provisions are espe-
cially tempting for the government to use in combating terrorism because
aliens have fewer constitutional protections than do citizens, and immi-
gration law is largely unconstrained by the rule of law.' 4  Not surpris-
ingly, immigration laws have been used in various ways to help combat
terrorism, including facilitating the detention of terrorist suspects.1 5 In-
deed, the government's use of immigration laws in its War on Terrorism
Selective Deportation and the First Amendment After Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313,
316 (2000) ("Immigration policies with foreign policy dimensions are by far the exception rather
than the rule. The vast bulk of immigration enforcement involves routine matters such as poverty,
crime, regulatory violations, and protection of the domestic labor market."). Due, in part, to the
country's high immigration and deportation rates, it is still true now.
11. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING 38-45 (2007); David Cole, Enemy
Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 988-1003 (2002).
12. For current provisions see, for example, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) (2006) (providing
authorization to deport if an alien's presence in the United States could result in "adverse foreign
policy consequences"); 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (b)(2)(C)(iv) (2006) (providing that the "Attorney General
may disregard [an alien's designation of a country to which he would like to be deported] if the
Attorney General decides that removing the alien to the country is prejudicial to the United States");
8 C.F.R. § 215.3 (b), (c) (2004) (providing that the Attorney General may block the departure of an
alien from the United States when it would be deemed prejudicial to national security interests to
permit him to depart).
13. See, e.g., Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999)
(referencing the government's power "to antagonize a particular foreign country by focusing on that
country's nationals"); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (noting that decisions relating to
immigration "may implicate our relations with foreign powers").
14. See infra Part II.A. (discussing the lack of constitutional restrictions on the government's
creation and use of immigration laws); see also Brian G. Slocum, Courts vs. The Political Branches:
Immigration "'Reform" and the Battle for the Future of Immigration Law, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
(forthcoming 2007).
15. See infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text (explaining how the government has used
immigration laws for national security purposes). The government has been explicit about its intent
to use immigration laws to fight terrorism. See Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocu-
mented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September I 1th "Pale of Law, " 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 639, 642 (2004) (quoting Attorney General John Ashcroft, "Let the terrorist among us be
warned: If you overstay your visa even by one day we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you
will be kept in jail and kept in custody as long as possible.").
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has made some immigration commentators fear that immigrants have
been unfairly linked to the figure of the terrorist. 1
6
In turn, even when the government's anti-terrorism actions do not
directly involve the application of specific immigration laws, they can
have a connection to immigration law. Unlike case (1) described above,
case (2) is traditionally considered to be an immigration case because the
Cuban national intended to immigrate to the United States (and immigra-
tion law refers to the federal law "governing the admission and the ex-
pulsion of aliens"),17 but both .'ase (1) and case (2) involve "aliens." 18
Even in situations, such as case (1), where the alien is not attempting to
enter the United States, a judicial decision that resolves territorial issues
regarding the availability of constitutional protections for aliens can have
a substantial impact on immigration cases. As mentioned above, courts
have recently struggled with the long-standing and controversial issue in
immigration law of which, if any, constitutional rights should be afforded
aliens, such as the Cuban national in case (2), who are considered to have
been stopped at the border.' 9 Thus, as this Article argues, the judicial
recognition that the alien in case (1) (similarly situated to the detainees in
the current Guantanamo cases) possesses constitutional rights, even
though arrested and detained outside of U.S. sovereign borders, should
help clarify that the Cuban national in case (2) also possesses constitu-
tional rights.
II. ALIENS AND THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION
Some commentators on the current Guantanamo detention cases
have been puzzled about why citizenship or territoriality should matter in
determining the constitutional rights of detainees at Guantanamo. ° To
immigration scholars, such a focus is not surprising. In immigration law,
both status and territoriality have historically been crucial in determining
the scope of applicable constitutional rights although, as indicated above,
the degree to which territorial issues should affect the constitutional
16. See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, Decoupling "Terrorist" from "Immigrant:" An Enhanced
Role for the Federal Courts Post 9/11, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 201 (2003).
17. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1984 SuP. CT. REV. 255, 256; see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century
of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. J. 545,
547 (1990) (defining immigration law as the law governing the admission and expulsion of aliens,
rather than the more general law of aliens' rights and obligations, such as their tax status and eligibil-
ity for government benefits and employment).
18. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006) (defining an alien as "any person not a citizen or national of the
United States").
19. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Supreme Court's "Enemy Combatant" Decisions:
Recognizing the Rights of Non-Citizens and the Rule of Law, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
409, 410 (2005) (arguing that the "Court never provided a coherent theory explaining why citizen-
ship should determine the scope of constitutional protections for those classified by the executive as
'enemy combatants').
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rights of aliens is a source of much debate and confusion.2' Section A of
this Part describes the confusion in immigration law regarding the appli-
cation of the Constitution to aliens stopped at the border. Section B de-
scribes the issues involving the extraterritorial application of the Consti-
tution in the current Guantanamo cases.
A. The Territorial Distinction and the "Entry Fiction" in Immigration
Law
Constitutional rights in immigration law are based on the "plenary
power doctrine," the territorial distinction, and the "entry fiction." The
Supreme Court has consistently maintained that, based on the United
States' existence as a sovereign state, the government possesses unfet-
tered "plenary power" to control immigration, and aliens, consequently,
possess far fewer constitutional rights than do citizens when the govern-
ment's immigration powers are being utilized.22 The constitutional rights
that aliens do possess are based on a longstanding territorial distinction.
Deportable aliens, those aliens deemed under immigration law to have
made an "entry" into the United States, are entitled to due process and
other constitutional rights.23 For constitutional (but no longer statutory)
purposes, an "entry" occurs even if the alien enters the country surrepti-
tiously.
24
Under the standard account, inadmissible aliens, considered under
immigration law as having not made an entry, have fewer, if any, consti-
tutional rights.25 Even if the Attorney General has "paroled," but not
21. Immigration law scholars have addressed these issues for some time. See, e.g., Gerald L.
Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991); Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Com-
pact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 11
(1985). As a result of the current Guantanamo detention cases, other scholars are also examining
issues relating to the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Geogra-
phy of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2501 (2005) (arguing that the historical importance of territori-
ality should be reexamined).
22. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 708 (1893) (asserting that the power to
deport is "an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to
its safety, its independence and its welfare .. "); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regula-
tion of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 Am. J. INT'L L. 862, 862 (1989) (stating that early cases
"denied virtually any authority for the judiciary to review substantive decisions as to which classes
of aliens should be entitled to enter or remain in the country").
23. Deportable aliens are entitled to at least due process rights. Whether, and to what extent,
they possess other constitutional rights is a matter of debate. See Brian G. Slocum, Canons, The
Plenary Power Doctrine and Immigration Law, 34 FL. ST. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007).
24. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 175 (1993) (holding that "[i]t is
important to note at the outset that our immigration laws have long made a distinction between those
aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission ... and those who are within the United
States after an entry, irrespective of its legality." (quotation omitted)). On September 30, 1996,
Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, which changed the definition of "deportable"
to only include those aliens who have been "admitted" into the U.S. See Brian G. Slocum, The
Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 524-25 (2003)
(explaining IIRIRA's changes to immigration terminology).
25. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (stating that "an alien seeking admission
to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for
2007] 1023
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formally admitted, an inadmissible alien into the country, under a con-
cept known as the "entry fiction" the alien is still considered to be at the
border, even though he or she may actually have lived and worked in this
country for many years.26 Needless to say, the entry fiction has been
harshly criticized by immigration scholars and others. 7
Application of the territorial distinction and entry fiction in immi-
gration law has produced some of the most egregious examples of the
rejection of the rule of law known to American jurisprudence. In one of
the most notorious cases, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
28
Mezei was excluded without a hearing based on confidential informa-
tion.29  Because Mezei could not establish his nationality, other nations
would not take him, and he remained confined by the government on
Ellis Island.30  Despite the indefinite, and potentially permanent, nature
of his detention, the Court held that Mezei's due process rights were not
violated because Mezei was treated "as if stopped at the border" and thus
had no due process rights.3'
The Mezei case is widely considered to be an example of the entry
fiction because Mezei was detained on Ellis Island rather than outside of
the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative .... [H]owever, once an alien gains
admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his consti-
tutional status changes accordingly.") (citations omitted). In IIRIRA, Congress substituted the term
"inadmissible" for "excludable" wherever the latter term appeared in the INA. I use the terms "in-
admissible" and "excludable" interchangeably. In using the term inadmissible, I intend for it to be
understood as synonymous with excludable, even if doing so is somewhat inaccurate, and to only
include those aliens who are deemed under immigration law to have been stopped at the border.
26. Congress has explicitly indicated that the parole of an alien into the country should not be
considered an entry. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2006) (specifying that "parole of such alien shall
not be regarded as an admission of the alien"). Courts have uniformly agreed that a parole should
not be considered an entry. See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188-90 (1958) (holding
that an alien paroled into the United States had not effected an entry); see also Charles D. Weissel-
berg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz
Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 954 (1995) (describing the entry fiction). The importance of having
entered the United States has led to significant litigation regarding whether an alien could be deemed
to have made an entry. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963) (determining whether a
return from a visit of a couple of hours in Mexico was an entry).
27. See, e.g., Ibrahim J. Wani, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate Uses of Legal
Fiction in Immigration Law, 11 CARDoZO L. REV. 51, 89-96 (1989) (lamenting that the entry fiction
is the primary determinant of procedural due process despite its "acknowledged falsity and outra-
geousness"); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1389-96 (1953).
28. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
29. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 208.
30. See id. Before his return from a trip abroad to visit his dying mother, Mezei had lived in
the United States for twenty-five years and was married to an American citizen. Id. at 216-17
(Black, J. dissenting).
31. Id. at 212 (holding that "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." (quotation omitted)). The Mezei case is not an
anomaly. The Court has made similar statements in other cases about the rights of inadmissible
aliens. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (holding that the
Attorney General was authorized to exclude the wife of a United States citizen without a hearing);
Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925) (holding that an alien who had been released into the
country for almost ten years was nevertheless "still in theory of law at the boundary line and had
gained no foothold in the United States." (citation omitted)).
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U.S. territory.32 Other cases, however, provide a better picture of how
courts have held that the entry fiction still retains its constitutional sig-
nificance even when the aliens are imprisoned within the United States
after having lived within the country for extended periods of time after
being paroled. In Gisbert v. Attorney General,33 for example, the detain-
ees were Mariel Cubans who had arrived in 1980 on the Mariel boatlift
and were granted parole into the United States.34 The detainees commit-
ted crimes, however, and, after the completion of their criminal sen-
tences, were imprisoned indefinitely by the government.35 Despite their
indefinite imprisonment within the United States, the Fifth Circuit held
that the detainees had no due process rights and thus no constitutional
right to be free from indefinite detention.36
Similar to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Gisbert, lower courts have
almost uniformly held that the government has constitutional authority to
indefinitely detain inadmissible aliens, even those aliens who have lived
in the United States for long periods of time. 7 Typically, these aliens are
indefinitely detained after they have received a final order of deportation
but their countries of origin refuse to accept their returns. In some cases,
the intransigence of the country of origin raises the possibility of perma-
nent detention. Perhaps the most notorious example is the thousands of
Cubans who, like the detainees in Gisbert, came to the United States on
the Mariel boatlift in 1980 and were subject to indefinite detention within
the United States after Cuba refused to accept their return.38 Cuba's in-
transigence is not unique, however. Other nations have also refused to
accept the return of their citizens.39
Despite the uncompromising reasoning in decisions such as Mezei,
the definition and scope of the entry fiction, as well as the significance of
territoriality, is now unclear.4° What is clear is that the doctrine is not as
absolute as it might have once seemed. In Landon v. Plasencia,41 the
Court indicated that a long-term resident alien had due process rights
even though she had been stopped at the border after a brief stay outside
32. See, e.g., David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention,
51 EMORY L. J. 1003, 1033-34 (2002).
33. 988 F.2d 1437 (5th Cir. 1993).
34. See Gisbert, 988 F.2d at 1439-40; see also supra note 3 (describing the Mariel boatlifi).
35. See Gisbert, 988 F.2d at 1439-40.
36. See id. at 1442-43; see also Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1443, 1449 (9th
Cir. 1995) (rehearing en banc) (holding that a Mariel Cuban detained by the government for the
previous ten years "in a variety of prisons" within the United States did not "have a constitutional
right to be free from detention, even for an extended time").
37. See Slocum, supra note 23, at 43.
38. See supra note 3.
39. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 684-86 (2001) (stating that one of the aliens
was indefinitely detained because his country of origin, Cambodia, does not have a repatriation
agreement with the United States and would not accept his return).
40. See Alvarez-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the
"precise reach of the entry fiction doctrine is unclear" (citation omitted)).
41. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
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of the country.42 In some recent cases, lower courts have indicated that
even inadmissible aliens who were never legal residents at all possess at
least some due process rights.43 Other courts, somewhat inconsistently,
have suggested that the "entry fiction" means that inadmissible aliens do
not possess procedural due process rights, but that they do have other
constitutional rights. 4
The confusion regarding the application of the Constitution to aliens
stopped at the border extends outside the traditional parameters of immi-
gration law. The rights of inadmissible aliens are based on a territorial
distinction, but some courts have, without much analysis of territoriality
issues, held that the entry fiction determines aliens' "rights with regard to
immigration and deportation proceedings" but does not limit the right of
aliens detained within United States territory to "humane treatment.,
45
Other courts have disagreed about the applicability of specific constitu-
tional provisions, such as the Fourth Amendment.46
Recent Supreme Court cases have not clarified the confusion re-
garding the reach of the Constitution. In Zadvydas v. Davis,4 7 the Su-
preme Court stated that the indefinite detention of deportable aliens
(those aliens considered to have entered the United States) would raise
serious constitutional issues. The Court rejected the government's argu-
ment that Mezei controlled, noting that the case before it involved de-
42. See Landon, 459 U.S. at 33-34.
43. See, e.g., Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 410 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding
that "[t]he fact that [inadmissible] aliens are entitled to less process ... does not mean that they are
not at all protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."), cert.
denied, 539 U.S. 941 (2003). While the Sixth Circuit recognized a due process right to be free from
indefinite detention, other courts have recognized more limited due process rights. See Ngo v. INS,
192 F.3d 390, 399 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that excludable aliens who could not be removed were
entitled, as a matter of due process, to periodic review of the necessity for their continued detention);
Correa v. Thornburgh, 901 F.2d 1166, 1171 n.5 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that apart from "protection[s]
against gross physical abuse," aliens seeking initial admission are entitled to no constitutional due
process protections).
44. See, e.g., Alvarez-Garcia, 378 F.3d 1094 (suggesting that inadmissible aliens possess
equal protection rights, although denying the specific claim of an equal protection violation); cf
Sierra v. INS, 258 F.3d 1213, 1218 n.3 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that the entry fiction "applies to
procedural due process challenges such as Sierra's. This case does not involve, and we do not ad-
dress, a substantive due process challenge... " (citation omitted)); Barrera-Echavarria, 44 F.3d at
1449 (explaining that "[w]hile it is... clear that excludable aliens have no procedural due process
rights in the admission process, the law is not settled with regard to nonprocedural rights").
45. Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1373 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Martinez-Aguero v.
Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that the entry fiction only applies to immigration
proceedings and aliens stopped at the border have a constitutional right to be free from false impris-
onment and the use of excessive force by law enforcement personnel).
46. Compare Martinez-Aguero, 459 F.3d 618 (holding that the "entry fiction" would not be
applied outside the immigration context and that the alien had a Fourth Amendment right to be free
from false imprisonment and use of excessive force), with United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F.
Supp. 2d 1254 (D. Utah 2003) (holding that even an alien who had been deported and then entered
the country illegally was not entitled to Fourth Amendment rights). See Linda Bosniak, A Basic
Territorial Distinction, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407, 411 (2002) (arguing that "if a paroled [Mariel
Cuban] is arrested on criminal charges, he is entitled to full criminal due process by virtue of his
presence here, and his lack of entry is irrelevant").
47. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
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portable not inadmissible aliens, and the "basic territorial distinction"
"runs throughout immigration law.''48  Because of the serious constitu-
tional concerns raised by the authorization of indefinite detention, the
Court interpreted the current INA provision authorizing detention, 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), as only allowing detention for a six month period
unless there is a "significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future .... ,49 The Court reasoned that it was not required by
the case to "consider the political branches' authority to control entry
into the United States," terrorism, or "other special circumstances," and
thus had left no "unprotected spot in the Nation's armor." 50  Subse-
quently, however, the Court held in Clark v. Martinez,51 that it had estab-
lished the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) in Zadvydas and that inter-
pretation must control even if the detention at issue involved inadmissi-
ble rather than deportable aliens.52
Based on the standard account of the entry fiction, the Cuban na-
tional in case (2) may not be entitled to any constitutional rights, even
though he is physically located in the United States.5 a Certainly, if the
executive branch possessed statutory authority to detain him indefinitely,
it could do so without violating the Constitution.54 But some lower
courts have challenged the standard account and have questioned
whether the Court's most extreme statements about the constitutional
rights of inadmissible aliens can really be taken literally.55
48. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693-94; see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power:
The Meaning and Impact ofZadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 375 (2002) (noting that
that the Court's opinion in Zadvydas "reaffirm[s] ... the border/interior distinction as a constitu-
tional matter").
49. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693, 701. The Court's decision was technically one of statutory
interpretation, but courts have treated the decision as though it also made binding statements regard-
ing the constitutional rights of aliens. See Slocum, supra note 23, at 22.
50. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695-96 (citation omitted).
51. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
52. See Martinez, 543 U.S. at 380-81.
53. This is especially true if the governmental actions at issue could be said to involve immi-
gration law. Governmental actions outside of immigration law involving inadmissible aliens may be
subject to closer constitutional scrutiny, although the extent of such protections is a matter of debate.
See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. The idea that inadmissible aliens have no constitu-
tional rights may intuitively strike some as an absurd overstatement, but the law is certainly not clear
that they have any constitutional rights. During oral argument in Clark v. Martinez, for example,
Justice Stevens asked the government attorney whether the government could just "shoot" the Mariel
Cubans. The government attorney responded, "Absolutely not" but gave no answer when Stevens
asked why. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 22-23, Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (No. 03-878).
54. The Court's decision in Martinez abruptly ended the ability that the executive branch had
enjoyed for decades to indefinitely detain inadmissible aliens. Congress is of course free to amend
the INA to once again grant the executive branch the power to indefinitely detain any inadmissible
alien. Thus, the potential that the executive branch will once again attempt to indefinitely detain
inadmissible aliens remains.
55. See, e.g., Rosales-Garcia, 322 F.3d at 410.
If [inadmissible] aliens were not protected by even the substantive component of consti-
tutional due process, as the government appears to argue, we do not see why the United
States government could not torture or summarily execute them. Because we do not be-
lieve that our Constitution could permit persons living in the United States ... to be sub-
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Unfortunately, even the decisions of the courts that have expressed
reservations about an extreme version of the entry fiction have raised
more questions than they have answered. If some of the extreme state-
ments about the rights of inadmissible aliens cannot be taken literally,
what rights do inadmissible aliens possess? If, as some courts have sug-
gested, the "entry fiction" deprives inadmissible aliens of some constitu-
tional rights but not others, what principle serves to distinguish amongst
the constitutional rights?56  How can it be that the entry fiction is de-
pendent on the view that the Constitution does not apply because the
alien has not entered the United States, but that this territorial fiction
mysteriously vanishes depending on whether the claim can be said to fall
within immigration law?
57
B. The Current Guantanamo Detention Cases and the Territorial Dis-
tinction
Not surprisingly, in the current Guantanamo detention cases courts
have struggled with the same constitutional issues that have perplexed
courts in immigration cases. Similar to immigration law, status is impor-
tant. It is likely that citizens are entitled to due process protections, even
when they have allegedly engaged in combat against the United States
and are detained outside the country. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,58 the Court
held that the President could not detain Hamdi, a United States citizen, as
an "enemy combatant" without the "essential constitutional promises" of
due process, including notice and an opportunity to be heard before a
neutral decision maker.59 In a plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor indi-
cated that the Court would have reached the same conclusion regarding
the scope of constitutional rights possessed by Hamdi even if he had
been detained in "Afghanistan or even Guantanamo Bay.",
60
jected to any government action without limit, we conclude that government treatment of
[inadmissible] aliens must implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id.
56. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing how some courts have stated that
the entry fiction may only deprive inadmissible aliens of procedural due process rights). While it is
important to highlight the unanswered questions regarding the constitutional rights of inadmissible
aliens, it is not the intention of this Article to define precisely the constitutional rights inadmissible
aliens should be afforded. This Article instead focuses on how a judicial recognition that the current
Guantanamo detainees possess constitutional rights should result in a subsequent judicial recognition
that inadmissible aliens possess due process rights sufficient to preclude indefinite detention. See
infra Part III.A.3.
57. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (describing how some courts have stated
that the entry fiction is limited to immigration law).
58. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
59. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
60. Id. at 524 (indicating that it is "not at all clear why [detention in the United States as
opposed to overseas] should make a determinative constitutional difference"). Illustrating the issues
of the interplay of status and territoriality that these cases raise, a lower court has held that an alien
captured within the United States and held as an enemy combatant is to be subject to the same due
process protections as the Court outlined in Hamdi, rejecting the detainee's arguments that his cap-
ture within U.S. territory entitled him to greater protections. See AI-Marri v. Wright, 443 F. Supp.
2d 774 (D.S.C. 2006). It has also been suggested that detainees captured in the theatre of war who
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Lower courts, in cases involving refugees and ones involving the
current detainees, have disagreed about whether alien detainees on Guan-
tanamo possess constitutional rights, however.61 The United States holds
the territory under a grant of indefinite duration that gives the govern-
ment complete jurisdiction and control over the territory.62 The determi-
nation of whether Guantanamo detainees possess constitutional rights
typically turns on how Guantanamo is characterized. Guantanamo is not
seen as functionally equivalent to the United States, but such a charac-
terization has not been necessary to a holding that the detainees possess
some constitutional rights. When Guantanamo is seen as equivalent to
an unincorporated U.S. territory (a territory not clearly destined for state-
hood), courts typically hold that the detainees possess constitutional
rights.63  Only "fundamental" constitutional rights are protected, how-
ever.64 When Guantanamo is characterized as equivalent to foreign terri-
tory, however, courts typically hold that the detainees have no constitu-
tional rights, although some scholars believe such decisions are errone-
ous.
65
Although the Court has had the opportunity, it has not yet clearly
decided the constitutional rights of the Guantanamo detainees. In Rasul
v. Bush,66 the Court indicated that it considers Guantanamo to be "terri-
tory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and
control" but not "ultimate sovereignty.' 67 The Court held that the de-
tainees at Guantanamo had a right under the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. §
2241, to challenge the legality of their detention, even though the United
are citizens of the country with whom we are at war may lack constitutional rights. See Ronald D.
Rotunda, The Detainee Cases of 2004 and 2006 and Their Aftermath, 57 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1, 33
(2006).
61. See Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REv. 1, 3-6 (2004)
(describing the refugee cases).
62. See Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1197, 1197-98 (1996).
63. See, e.g., Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727, 738 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that for habeas
purposes, Guantanamo was a part of the sovereign territory of the United States); see also In re
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 462-64 (D.D.C. 2005) (recognizing the "special
nature of Guantanamo Bay" and characterizing it as the "equivalent of a U.S. territory in which
fundamental constitutional rights exist."); Neuman, supra note 61, at 15, 34-43.
64. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (1990) (holding that "[o]nly
'fundamental' constitutional rights are guaranteed to inhabitants of those territories" (citations omit-
ted)).
65. See, e.g., Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311,321 (D.D.C. 2005) (stating that the detain-
ees are held on foreign territory and determining that they therefore have no constitutional rights); Al
Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004). The decisions holding that the detainees lack constitutional rights typically rely on
cases such as Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, where the Court held that the Fourth Amendment
does not apply to a search of a nonresident's property in Mexico. See also Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763, 781-85 (1950) (rejecting the extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment).
Professor Neuman argues that the detainees should receive due process protections regardless of
how Guantanamo is classified. See Neuman, supra note 61, at 44-53 (arguing that the Court should
hold that long-term detainees held in an offshore prison are entitled to fundamental due process
protections).
66. 542 U.S. 466.
67. Id. at 476 (quotation omitted).
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States lacked formal sovereignty over the territory.68 In the fifteenth, and
last, footnote in the opinion, the Court stated that:
[Being] held in Executive detention for more than two years in terri-
tory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the
United States, without access to counsel and without being charged
with any wrongdoing-unquestionably describe[s] "custody in viola-
tion of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States," 
69
which is all that the habeas statute requires.
Soon after the Court's decision in Rasul, many prominent legal
scholars argued, based mostly on the quoted passage above, that the
Court held, or at least strongly implied, that the aliens possess constitu-
tional rights. 70 Lower courts disagreed, though, about how the case
should be interpreted. In one case, In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases,
71
the district court held that the Court in Rasul indicated that the aliens
detained on Guantanamo possess a "fundamental right to due process. 72
In another case, Khalid v. Bush,73 the district court held that the Court's
decision in Rasul was merely a statutory holding and that even if the
detainees have a statutory right to habeas corpus, they do not have con-
stitutional protections.74
The Court's recent decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,75 involving a
Yemeni national captured by the United States in Afghanistan and de-
68. See id at 484.
69. Id at 483 n. 15 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006)).
70. In addition to the language quoted above in the text, the fifteenth footnote in Rasul also
cited to Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Verdugo-Uquidez, 494 U.S. 259, where he argued
that "the Government may act only as the Constitution authorizes, whether the actions in question
are foreign or domestic." Id. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted). As noted above,
some scholars have interpreted the Rasul footnote as indicating that the detainees possess constitu-
tional rights. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology
After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2073, 2073 (2005) (arguing that the "majority opinion
strongly suggests in a footnote that foreign nationals in U.S. custody at Guantanamo .. .possess
constitutional rights" but noting that the "opinion leaves ambiguous the reason why foreign nationals
have constitutional rights there-whether because they are human beings in long-term U.S. custody
or because of the special character of U.S. authority at Guantanamo"); Kermit Roosevelt III, Guan-
tanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017, 2026-28 (2005)
(arguing that the Court at least hinted that the detainees possess constitutional rights); Neal K.
Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in the Guantanamo Cases, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
49, 55 (stating that the "sharp reference to Justice Kennedy's Verdugo concurrence underscores the
point-that certain fundamental rights may apply abroad"). Some commentators would no doubt
argue that, even apart from the language in the footnote, the Court's statutory holding compels the
recognition that the detainees possess constitutional rights. See Hart, supra note 27, at 1393 ("The
great and generating principle of this whole body of law-that the Constitution always applies when
a court is sitting with jurisdiction in habeas corpus"); Roosevelt, supra at 2026 (suggesting that the
scope of habeas jurisdiction should be deemed to be coextensive with the scope of substantive fed-
eral rights).
71. 355 F. Supp. 2d 443.
72. Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 463.
73. 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, vacated by Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
74. Khalid, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
75. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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tained on Guantanamo, was similarly decided without a determination of
the constitutional rights possessed by the detainees. In Hamdan, the Su-
preme Court invalided the military commissions set up by the govern-
ment to try the Guantanamo detainees on the basis of federal statutes
relating to military justice, treaties relating to the treatment of military
detainees, and the customary international laws of war.76 While the deci-
sion is undoubtedly important, by deciding the case on non-constitutional
grounds, and thus allowing Congress to legislate around the decision, the
Supreme Court did not quite deliver the "knockout blow" that some
commentators had described the decision as delivering.77
Soon after the Hamdan decision, Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act (MCA), which purported to strip federal courts of ju-
risdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by any "alien" detained by
the United States as an "enemy combatant." 78 Recently, the D.C. Circuit
held that the statute clearly stripped courts of jurisdiction over habeas
corpus petitions and that the statute was constitutional with regard to the
alien detainees on Guantanamo because an alien captured abroad and
detained outside the sovereign territory of the United States is not pro-
tected under the Suspension Clause.79 In the D.C. Circuit's view, the
Supreme Court's decision in Rasul rested only on statutory interpretation
and did not compel a constitutional holding in favor of the detainees.8 0
The D.C. Circuit reasoned that Guantanamo is no different than a foreign
country because Congress has made clear that Cuba, and not the United
States, has sovereignty over Guantanamo.81
III. IMMIGRATION LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY ABSENT THE
"ENTRY FICTION"
Now that Congress has eliminated statutory habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion, resolution of the Guantanamo cases will likely force the Supreme
Court to decide the constitutional rights of the detainees.82 Section A
76. See Ariel Zemach, Taking War Seriously: Applying the Law of War to Hostilities Within
an Occupied Territory, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 645, 655-56 (2006) (describing the Hamdan
decision).
77. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, More Real Than Apparent: Separation of Powers, the Rule
of Law, and Comparative Executive "'Creativity" in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
51, 51 (2005-2006) (describing the "common view" that the Court had delivered a "knockout
blow").
78. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 950j, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006).
79. See Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 991-94, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007).
80. See Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 992 n. 10.
81. See id. at 992. On remand from the Supreme Court, the District Court in Hamdan also
held that Hamdan was not constitutionally entitled to habeas corpus because, although he has been a
prisoner of the United States for five years, his detention on Guantanamo "lacks the geographical
and volitional predicates necessary to claim a constitutional right to habeas corpus." See Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 16-18 (D.D.C. 2006) (citation omitted).
82. Such a decision may not be immediate, however. The Supreme Court has denied certio-
rari in Boumediene. See Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478. The Court may decide to hear the
case at a later date, however. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739, provides
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explains why judicial recognition that the Guantanamo detainees possess
constitutional rights should lead to subsequent judicial recognition that
inadmissible aliens detained within the United States also possess consti-
tutional rights, including rights against indefinite detention. Section B
argues that the recognition that at least some inadmissible aliens possess
constitutional rights would not undermine the government's national
security efforts. Thus, as Section C explains, recognition that the Cuban
national from case (2) possesses constitutional rights against indefinite
detention would not necessarily mean that the Swiss national from case
(1) also possesses constitutional rights against indefinite detention.
A. The Possibility that the Current Guantanamo Cases Could Lead to
the End of the "Entry Fiction" in Immigration Law
1. The Effects of a Holding That the Detainees Lack Constitutional
Rights
The range of possible grounds for a decision regarding the constitu-
tional rights of the current Guantanamo detainees is, of course, relatively
large. For example, the Supreme Court could decline to address whether
the current detainees possess fundamental constitutional rights on the
basis that even if they do, such rights do not include a right to habeas
corpus. 83 Conversely, the Court could hold that the current Guantanamo
detainees do not possess any constitutional rights. Any of the Court's
possible holdings would likely not prevent any lower court from reexam-
ining the entry fiction and holding that aliens located within the United
States (even if under the entry fiction) possess at least some constitu-
tional rights, however.84 A decision by the Supreme Court that territori-
ality will continue to retain its importance in determining constitutional
for limited review by the D.C. Circuit of certain determinations of the Combatant Status Review
Tribunals. The statute will undoubtedly be challenged on the basis that it does not provide a consti-
tutionally adequate substitute for habeas corpus. If it is challenged on this basis, it is probable that
the Court will grant certiorari. Three Justices (Justices Breyer, Souter and Ginsburg) dissented from
the denial of certiorari in Boumediene, and Justices Steven and Kennedy issued a statement indicat-
ing that they would agree to hear the case if aliens seek to establish that they would agree to hear the
case if the aliens seek to establish that they have been injured by the Detainee Treatment Act. See
127 S. Ct. 1478. In any case, review of the constitutional rights of the alien detainees would not be
likely if Congress passes legislation restoring habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Habeas Corpus Resto-
ration Act of 2006, S. 4081, 109th Cong. (2006). The passage of such a statute would again present
the possibility of nonconstitutional decisions.
83. For a discussion of the complexities of the Suspension Clause issues see Amanda Tyler, Is
Suspension a Political Question, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 408-12 (2006); James E. Pfander, The Limits
of Habeas Jurisdiction and the Global War on Terror, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 537-38 (2006).
84. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (describing the judicial confusion regarding
the definition and scope of the entry fiction). Indeed, the Court could hold that the current Guan-
tanamo detainees lack constitutional rights for reasons unconnected to immigration law, such as, for
example, their status as "enemy combatants," although a decision relying solely on such a basis
seems unlikely. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 991 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (indicating that its
decision holding that the alien detainees on Guantanamo lack protection under the Suspension
Clause was based on territoriality and that enemy alien status played no role); see also Rotunda,
supra note 60, at 33 (indicating the possibility that detainees captured in the theatre of war who are
citizens of the country with whom we are at war may lack constitutional rights).
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rights would not necessarily compel the continuing recognition of territo-
rial fictions. In other words, a holding that aliens detained on foreign
territory do not possess constitutional rights should not preclude a hold-
ing that detainees on U.S. soil do possess constitutional rights.
A decision by the Court regarding the constitutional rights of the
current Guantanamo detainees would thus not likely prevent lower courts
from eliminating the entry fiction and holding that aliens have due proc-
ess rights sufficient to prevent indefinite detention.85 A holding that an
alien in the position of the Cuban national in case (2) possesses constitu-
tional rights sufficient to preclude indefinite detention would not, how-
ever, require the elimination of the entry fiction.86 Certainly, inadmissi-
ble aliens may constitutionally be detained pending their deportation.
87
However, as some courts have recognized, inadmissible aliens have con-
stitutional rights (including due process rights) that protect them from
governmental actions that occur outside of immigration law.88 Indefinite
detention when there is no foreseeable possibility of deportation could be
analogized to these cases outside of immigration law that recognize that
inadmissible aliens possess constitutional rights. As the Court stated in
Zadvydas, once deportation is no longer foreseeable, the immigration
justification for the detention is absent and continued detention is thus
unreasonable. 89  Thus, indefinite detention could be characterized by
courts as government action that occurs outside of immigration law. At
the same time, courts could continue to hold that inadmissible aliens
85. Indeed, although it is in the minority, the Sixth Circuit has already held that indefinite
detention of inadmissible aliens is unconstitutional. See Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386
(6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 941 (2003).
86. In any case, lower courts would not of course be able to overrule Supreme Court prece-
dent and would thus have to distinguish Mezei and other entry fiction cases. In Rosales-Garcia, the
Sixth Circuit did just that in holding that the indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens is unconstitu-
tional. Rosales-Garcia, 322 F.3d. at 413-14 (claiming that the Court in Mezei "explicitly grounded
its decision in the special circumstances of a national emergency and the determination by the Attor-
ney General that Mezei presented a threat to national security").
87. Cf Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (stating that "detention or
temporary confinement, as part of the means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclu-
sion or expulsion of aliens, would be valid. Proceedings to exclude or expel would be vain if those
accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into their true character, and while ar-
rangements were being made for their deportation.").
88. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
89. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699-700 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,
527 (2003) (reasoning that the potentially indefinite detention in Zadvydas "did not serve its pur-
ported immigration purpose" because it affected aliens for whom removal was "no longer practically
attainable" due to the aliens' native countries refusing to accept their return); Cole, supra note 32, at
1007 (arguing that "preventive detention should be constitutionally permissible only where neces-
sary in aid of removal."). A decision that indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens, like indefinite
detention of deportable aliens, is outside of immigration law would not require a court to directly
overrule Mezei. See supra note 86. It would, however, require a somewhat aggressive interpretation
of Zadvydas, considering that the Court indicated that indefinite detention of deportable aliens was
outside of immigration law when deportation is not foreseeable, but, at the same time, emphasized
the territorial distinction in immigration law. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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have no constitutional rights with regard to immigration and deportation
proceedings. 90
2. The Effects of a Broad Holding That the Detainees Possess Con-
stitutional Rights
If the Court holds that the Guantanamo detainees possess constitu-
tional rights, however, the decision should compel lower courts to con-
clude that (at least some) inadmissible aliens possess constitutional
rights. A broad (and very unlikely) holding by the Court that Guan-
tanamo is not equivalent to an unincorporated U.S. territory, but that the
Constitution binds the federal government wherever it acts would raise
many difficult issues for immigration law.91 Such a ruling could be con-
strued as overruling the "basic territorial distinction" in immigration law
and establishing that all inadmissible aliens potentially possess at least
92some constitutional rights. Discounting the importance of territory as a
determinant of constitutional rights would not, however, necessarily un-
dermine the importance of status. The recognition that inadmissible
aliens have constitutional rights would not mean that they would be enti-
tled to the same rights as deportable aliens.93 Courts would undoubtedly
hold that inadmissible aliens have fewer constitutional rights due to their
diminished connection to the United States.94
Nevertheless, many would be troubled by the idea that aliens with
little or no connection to the United States would be able to make consti-
tutional claims regarding actions by the U.S. government that occur on
foreign soil. Consider, for example, a national of a foreign country, say
Switzerland, who applies for a visa at a consulate in Switzerland that
would allow her to enter the United States. The Swiss national claims
that her application was denied because of her political associations, in
violation of the First Amendment. 95 Recognizing such claims would be a
significant departure from our current system.96 In essence, such recog-
90. See Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1373 (5th Cir. 1987).
91. See Neuman, supra note 61, at 44; see also supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text
(describing the different ways that courts have characterized the status of Guantanamo).
92. See supra Part II.A (describing the territorial distinction in immigration law).
93. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (explaining the differences between inad-
missible and deportable aliens).
94. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 694 (indicating that the nature of constitutional protections
"may vary depending upon status and circumstance" (citation omitted)); see also David A. Martin,
Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v.
Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47 (describing how immigration status affects constitutional rights).
95. A holding that the Constitution applies wherever the government acts could be limited
(and most likely would be) to only the application of certain constitutional provisions, such as due
process. See Roosevelt, supra note 70, at 2042-43. Even if the hypothetical above involved a due
process claim, instead of a First Amendment claim, however, many would no doubt still be troubled
by the idea that an alien with little or no connection to the United States could make constitutional
claims when the government action in question occurs on foreign soil.
96. See Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass'n v. Reno, 18 F. Supp. 2d 38, 60 (D.D.C. 1998) (re-
jecting the aliens' constitutional challenge to the procedures for expedited removal of aliens arriving
in the United States without proper documentation because, as aliens seeking initial admission, they
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nition could mean that any alien who comes into contact with our immi-
gration system (even through voluntary application) would possess at
least some constitutional rights.97 While some commentators would no
doubt celebrate such an extension of the reach of the Constitution, specu-
lation about the effects of a broad constitutional holding described above
is likely purely academic considering the unlikelihood of such a decision.
3. The Effects of a Narrow Holding That the Detainees Possess
Constitutional Rights
A narrower (and much more likely) ruling by the Court that catego-
rizes Guantanamo as equivalent to an unincorporated United States terri-
tory and holds that the detainees therefore have fundamental constitu-
tional rights should still impact immigration law even if the Court does
not make any broad statements about the extraterritorial reach of the
Constitution.98 Such a holding would not necessarily lead to the recogni-
tion of constitutional rights for all inadmissible aliens, however. For one
reason, many alleged constitutional violations would involve nonresident
aliens in foreign territories. Thus, the narrower holding would not raise
the question of whether the precedents precluding a constitutional chal-
lenge in the visa example above should be reconsidered.
A narrower ruling should raise questions about the continuing valid-
ity of the entry fiction in immigration law, though.99 A holding that
maintained that detainees being held indefinitely on Guantanamo possess
fundamental constitutional rights without subsequent repudiation (in all
jurisdictions) of the principle that detainees being held indefinitely in the
United States possess no constitutional rights would be arbitrary and
nonsensical. °00 Similar to a broad holding, a narrow holding would not
compel the recognition that deportable and inadmissible aliens possess
equivalent rights (or even that inadmissible aliens possess a great deal of
constitutional protection), but it could place inadmissible aliens in a simi-
had no procedural due process rights); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 617 (2006) (stating that "[a]s extraterritorial decision makers ... consular
officers have substantial de facto leeway, employ informal procedures, and are not subject to judicial
review.").
97. See Hiroshi Motomura, Review Essay, Whose Immigration Law?: Citizens, Aliens, and
the Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1567, 1579 (1997) (questioning whether the alien in the posi-
tion of the Swiss national described above should be able to make a constitutional claim).
98. See Neuman, supra note 70, at 2073-74 (predicting that the cases will be resolved on
issues peculiar to Guantanamo). Another possibility is a narrower holding that turns on the special
circumstances involving long-term detention by the government rather than the characterization of
Guantanamo. See Neuman, supra note 61, at 44-53.
99. Or, to put it another way, the decision could resolve the current confusion regarding the
entry fiction by leading to a clarification by lower courts that the entry fiction only means that inad-
missible aliens have less constitutional protection than do deportable aliens, not that they are entirely
without constitutional protection.
100. Of course, the entry fiction itself is arbitrary and nonsensical, so there is no guarantee that
the entry fiction would be reexamined on the basis of the outcome of the current Guantanamo cases.
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lar position as deportable aliens with regard to indefinite detention.10' If
inadmissible aliens possess due process protections, even if to a lesser
extent than deportable aliens, there may be no principled basis for deter-
mining that deportable aliens, but not inadmissible aliens, have a due
process liberty interest against indefinite detention. 10 2  This would be
especially true if, as discussed above, a court were to characterize the
indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens as falling outside the scope of
immigration law. 1
03
B. The National Security Implications of the Recognition of Constitu-
tional Rights for Inadmissible Aliens
A decision that inadmissible aliens have constitutional rights against
indefinite detention would undoubtedly be opposed by the government
on national security grounds. '04 The government would likely claim that
a decision eliminating the entry fiction and preventing the indefinite de-
tention of inadmissible aliens would prevent it from controlling entry
into the country. A foreign state could, for example, simply refuse to
accept the return of its citizens, knowing that the U.S. government would
likely be forced to eventually release the aliens into the United States. 5
The government would argue that elimination of the entry fiction would
thus violate the promise of the Court in Zadvydas that by recognizing the
territorial distinction in immigration law, it left no "unprotected spot in
the Nation's armor."'1 6  Such fears would likely be taken seriously.
101. Cf Michael Louis Corrado, Sex Offenders, Unlawful Combatants, and Preventative De-
tention, 84 N.C. L. REV. 77, 113-20 (2005) (arguing that Congress could not constitutionally author-
ize indefinite detention even for terrorist suspects).
102. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 694-95 (stating "[n]or are we aware of any other authority that
would support. . . limitation of due process protection for removable aliens to freedom from deten-
tion that is arbitrary or capricious"); cf id at 690 (requiring a "sufficiently strong special justifica-
tion.., for indefinite civil detention"). Any distinction between deportable and inadmissible aliens
would be especially weak if one concludes that deportable aliens who entered the country surrepti-
tiously would be protected from indefinite detention under Zadvydas. See supra notes 47-50 and
accompanying text (explaining the Zavydas decision). As of now, this issue is undecided. See supra
note 24 and accompanying text (explaining that the definition of deportable aliens for both constitu-
tional and statutory purposes used to include surreptitious entries into the United States but now the
statutory definition only includes lawful entries).
103. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
104. Cf Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699-700 (responding to the government's national security and
foreign policy concerns about its decision).
105. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing a situation, the Mariel boatlift, where
a foreign state authorized the departure of its citizens and refused to accept their return). One possi-
ble (but highly objectionable) way around the problem would be for the government to house the
aliens on foreign soil. See Neuman, supra note 70, at 2074 (noting that the government could "relo-
cate its operations for maritime enforcement of U.S. immigration laws against refugees, economic
migrants, and smugglers" to more "authentically extraterritorial venues"). This would only be a
feasible alternative, however, if aliens detained on foreign territory do not possess constitutional
rights that could be asserted against detention. See Part III.A.2. (discussing the possibility that the
Court could hold that aliens located on foreign territory possess constitutional rights).
106. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695-96. Of course, the Court followed up its decision in Zadvydas
by holding that the government did not have statutory authority to detain inadmissible aliens indefi-
nitely; see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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Lower courts have assumed the legitimacy of the scenario described
above in justifying the indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens.
0 7
Nevertheless, the government's national security fears would be
misplaced. Elimination of the entry fiction would not result in open bor-
ders. It would only give inadmissible aliens some constitutional rights.
Most, if not all, of the government's existing anti-terrorism related meas-
ures that involve immigration laws (as well as those that involve non-
immigration laws) would still be allowed if the entry fiction were to be
eliminated.108 Eliminating the entry fiction would not, after all, necessar-
ily eliminate the plenary power doctrine. 10 9 Thus, governmental actions
would, for the most part, not be subject to mainstream constitutional con-
straints.
Detention, likely even indefinite detention, would still be constitu-
tionally permissible in some circumstances'10 In Zadvydas, the Court
made clear that special circumstances such as terrorism might require
"heightened deference" to Congress when a court considers a statute that
provides for terrorism-related detention of deportable aliens."' Un-
doubtedly, the "heightened deference" to Congress would be even more
heightened for a statute that provided for the detention of inadmissible
aliens. At the very least, short-term detention would be constitutionally
permissible. In Demore v. Kim," 2 for example, the Court held that the
mandatory detention of criminal permanent resident aliens pending their
deportation hearings does not violate due process, stating that "[i]n the
exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Con-
gress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citi-
zens." l 3 Thus, the government would still be able to use federal immi-
107. See Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1448 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (stating
that "[a] judicial decision requiring that excludable aliens be released into American society when
neither their countries of origin nor any third country will admit them might encourage the sort of
intransigence Cuba has exhibited in the negotiations over the Mariel refugees."); Jean v. Nelson, 727
F.2d 957, 975 (11 th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (holding that "this approach would ultimately result in our
losing control over our borders. A foreign leader could eventually compel us to grant physical
admission via parole to any aliens he wished by the simple expedient of sending them here and then
refusing to take them back."), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). The same problem could arise currently,
however, under the Court's decision in Zadvydas if the aliens entered the country surreptitiously
instead of being stopped at the border. See supra note 102.
108. 1 am not endorsing all of the government's anti-terrorism efforts, but merely explaining
how they would not be jeopardized by the elimination of the entry fiction.
109. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (describing the plenary power doctrine).
110. Arguably, the Court has already acknowledged that the terrorism-related detainees on
Guantanamo may be indefinitely detained. See infra note 122.
111. 533 U.S. at 696 (stating that "[we do not] consider terrorism or other special circum-
stances where special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened
deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national security.").
Subsequent to Zadvydas, Congress passed a statute providing for the indefinite detention of terrorist
suspects. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001 § 412, 8 U.S.C. § 1226a (2006).
112. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
113. Demore, 538 U.S. at 521, 530 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)).
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gration laws to arrest and detain aliens suspected of terrorist ties, as it did
after the September 11 th attacks without constitutional problems.'
1 14
The government would also be able to continue its other controver-
sial (and many would say ill-conceived) uses of immigration laws to
enhance national security. Eliminating the entry fiction certainly would
not prevent the government from tracking the movements of foreign na-
tionals who enter the United States. The government would thus not be
prevented from having registration programs like the National Security
Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), which requires nationals of
certain countries to be fingerprinted and photographed upon entry, to
register periodically with the government, and to comply with exit con-
trols when they leave the country.1 15 The government would thus be able
to continue to engage in racial profiling and selective treatment of Arabs
and Muslims, including singling them out for deportation.1 6 In addition,
the government would still be able to take a myriad of other actions, such
as closing removal hearings and targeting aliens based on their political
associations. 1 17
C. Inadmissible Aliens, Indefinite Detention, and Legal Fictions
It is intuitive to believe that issues of national security inevitably
lead to greater judicial deference to the political branches' assertions of
authority, and decreased respect for constitutional and human rights.
18
While undoubtedly true in large part, the current Guantanamo detainee
cases present an opportunity for courts to counter that assumption, at
114. See Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional Consequences
of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction
Without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 609, 620-22 (2005) (describing the massive arrests
that occurred after the attacks of 9/11); Donald Kerwin, The Use and Misuse of "National Security "
Rationale in Crafting U.S. Refugee and Immigration Policies, 17 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 749, 749-50
(2005); Margaret H. Taylor, Dangerous by Decree: Detention Without Bond in Immigration Pro-
ceedings, 50 LoY. L. REV. 149, 152 (2004).
115. See Akram & Karmely, supra note 114, at 630-32 (describing the NSEERS program).
116. See id. at 630-31 (describing how the government has engaged in racial profiling and
selective treatment of Arabs and Muslims). Thus far, challenges to the government's activities have
not been particularly successful. See, e.g., Zafar v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 461 F.3d 1357, 1367 (11 th Cir.
2006) (citing Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that it
was not an equal protection violation to require the aliens to register pursuant to the NSEERS proc-
ess and rejecting the petitioners' argument that the NSEERS program infringed their equal protec-
tion rights by "precipitat[ing] them being placed in these discretionary removal proceedings by the
Attorney General" because the record did not support the argument)); Ali v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 678,
681-82 (5th Cir. 2006) (rejecting argument that NSEERS program violated equal protection).
117. See generally Neuman, supra note 10 (describing the difficulties of challenging immigra-
tion decisions on the basis of the First Amendment). Some courts have recognized certain First
Amendment limitations on the government in the context of deportation proceedings, however. See
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 710 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is a First
Amendment right of access to deportation proceedings that was violated by a government directive
that required closure of "special interest" deportation proceedings).
118. Cf Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surro-
gates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1642 (1992) (explaining how
the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence for aliens became less favorable "at the height of
McCarthyism and the nation's preoccupation with the perceived Communist threat").
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least as regards the entry fiction in immigration law. Under the standard
theory of the entry fiction, the Cuban national in case (2) does not have
any constitutional protections and may be detained in a U.S. prison in-
definitely without violating the Constitution. 19  As explained above, a
judicial recognition that the detainees on Guantanamo possess constitu-
tional rights should change the outcome of case (2).120 The Cuban na-
tional would have constitutional rights, including, absent evidence of a
national security threat or other special circumstances, constitutional
rights that should be recognized as sufficiently strong to prevent indefi-
nite detention.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to join the debate regarding the
precise constitutional rights that should be guaranteed the current Guan-
tanamo detainees. Nevertheless, while the recognition that the aliens on
Guantanamo possess constitutional rights could lead to the elimination of
the entry fiction in immigration law, the government would still be able
to take use immigration and other laws to ensure national security.'
2'
Thus, the Swiss national from case (1) might have fundamental constitu-
tional rights, but those rights may not be sufficient to prevent indefinite
detention. 122
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court ultimately rules that the
current Guantanamo detainees possess constitutional rights, it is time for
the entry fiction to be further redefined, or eliminated altogether.123 It is
true that legal fictions are not unique to immigration law. 124  Fictions
should be discarded, however, when they are unnecessary and im-
moral. 25 Thus, because there is no need for a legal fiction that pretends
that aliens imprisoned within the United States are actually outside our
territory and thus unprotected by the Constitution, 126 the entry fiction
should be discarded.
119. See supra Part II.A. (describing the entry fiction and indefinite detention). The executive
branch would also need statutory authority in order to detain the Cuban national indefinitely, which
it does not currently possess. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. The current lack of
statutory authority should not give inadmissible aliens much comfort, however. Such authority can
easily be granted the executive branch.
120. See supra Part III.A.3.
121. See supra Part III.B.
122. It is perhaps true that not even citizens have a right to be free from indefinite detention
when they are detained as enemy combatants. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004)
(stating that detention was authorized, in a case involving a citizen, for as long as "United States
troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan"). But see Corrado, supra note 101.
123. As discussed earlier, the entry fiction can be defined to exclude indefinite detention on the
theory that indefinite detention when deportation is not foreseeable is outside of immigration law,
and thus outside the scope of the entry fiction. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
124. See Note, Lessons From Abroad: Mathematical, Poetic, and Literary Fictions in the Law,
115 HARV. L. REv. 2228 (2002).
125. The entry fiction is unnecessary because the government can ably protect national security
without resorting to the entry fiction. See supra Part IlI.B.
126. There have been arguments that eliminating the entry fiction could compel the govern-
ment to refuse to parole aliens into the country. See Martin, supra note 94, at 81-83, 99-100 (stating
that granting parolees due process protections may induce restrictions on the parole program); see
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Perhaps it is time for a new legal fiction, the "detention fiction,"
that allows inadmissible aliens to avoid indefinite imprisonment while
recognizing the extreme limits on their claim to remain in the United
States. Ordering an alien released on parole is not equivalent to afford-
ing the alien legal admission into the country. Although temporarily free
of custody, an inadmissible alien has no legal right to remain in the
United States and can be deported whenever the United States is able to
do so. In addition, an alien released on parole may be subjected to re-
lease conditions that aim to meet the government's security concerns.
127
Releasing the alien is no more a legal "entry" than is holding him in cus-
tody within the United States. Thus, under the detention fiction, an alien
would be legally considered to be detained by the government, but would
be free from imprisonment. Such a legal fiction is certainly less prepos-
terous than the current entry fiction, and is a good deal more humane.
CONCLUSION
It is impossible to deny that human rights have been a major casu-
alty of the War on Terrorism. Counterintuitively, though, the War on
Terrorism may have some positive effects on immigration law because it
may help lead to the elimination of the entry fiction. While this would
result in the recognition that inadmissible aliens possess constitutional
rights, and thus move immigration law closer to the rule of law ideal, its
effects should not be overstated. Immigration law would still suffer from
unnecessary unfairness and discrimination, and the government would
still be able to use immigration laws for national security purposes.
Nevertheless, national security issues may dominate the current dis-
course on immigration law, but given the many reasons for our current
high-volume admission system, immigration responses to terrorism will
always be secondary. 2 8 Despite the modest nature of the changes that
the elimination of the entry fiction would bring, the possible recognition
that even aliens stopped at our borders possess fundamental constitu-
tional rights should be celebrated.
also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953) (stating that government
could choose to "keep entrants by sea aboard the vessel pending determination of their admissibil-
ity"). It is true that the government could choose to detain aliens in a purely foreign territory and
perhaps not be bound by the Constitution. See supra note 105. It is, however, a rather weak argu-
ment that the entry fiction should not be eliminated because the government may then look to indefi-
nitely detain aliens on foreign soil rather than within the United States.
127. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696 (stating that the issue before the Court was "not between
imprisonment and the alien 'living at large"' but rather "between imprisonment and supervision
under release conditions that may not be violated" (citation omitted)).
128. See David A. Martin, Preventive Detention: Immigration Law Lessons for the Enemy
Combatant Debate, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 305, 307 (2004).
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